

Education, Studentship, and the
Disposition to Civil Unrest among Youths
in Resource-Abundant Regions:
Evidence from Nigeria's Delta

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Ika Revolutionary Movement Threatens War!

- “...For some time now, we have been observing with interest, all statements and press conferences from the various groups in ijaw land that they are freedom fighters, fighting to liberate or for the emancipation of the oil states from the federal Government so to say and at the end, they proceed to their various state house to be paid N100,000.000,00 monthly which was supposed to be meant for developments in these states of the region (delta, rivers, bayelsa, edo, etc) to mention but a few, now, the big question is who is fooling who?? we all have arms and know where to purchase more arms and how to apply these arms in the niger delta crises and at the end we will get our fair share of the state's monthly allocation as well..”

*Source: Masterweb News Desk
(Thursday, July 17, 2008)*


Niger Delta Youths Urged to Embrace Skill Acquisition

- The administrator of a youth resource centre in Sapele, Delta State, Mr. Austine Dafitohuo has called on youths in the Niger Delta to avail themselves of the opportunity to be trained in the centre to enable them acquire the needed skills that will earn them decent living.

“...There is opportunity to continue life; oil is not the end of life. As youths you have ample opportunity to improve your life by learning trades which abound here in this centre. Everybody cannot work in the oil firms; you can still earn a living outside oil”.

Source: *Guardian Newspaper, November 2008*

Niger Delta, Nigeria



Introduction: Niger Delta, Facts & Figures

- Area of about 70,000sq (7.5% of Nigeria's land mass)
- Officially 9 states, 185 local government areas,
- Population of about 28-31 million (20-22% of Nigeria's total)
- 40 ethnic groups (The Ijaws being the largest and the fourth largest in Nigeria, after the Hausa/Fulanis, Yorubas and Igbos).
- Currently produce all of Nigeria's oil.

- Massive oil infrastructure consisting of '606 fields, 5284 wells, 7,000kms of pipelines, 10 exports terminals 275 flow stations, 10 gas plants, 4 refineries and massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector' (Watts, 2007)'.

- Historically and cartographically consists of 3 states (Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers, 3, 5 & 9 in map), which accounts for the bulk of oil production and has been the epicenter of oil-related violence. The UNDP (2007) identified 120-150 'high risk and active violent conflict in these states alone (Watts, 2007).

Introduction: The Niger Delta Crisis

Late 1980s to mid 1990s: relatively peaceful protests/agitations drawing attention to massive environmental degradation associated with oil exploration, non-compensation for indigenous right to land and damages, and the very poor developmental state of the region.

Ignited by the Ogonis, joined later by other ethnic groups

Mid 1990s-2004: Era of violent protests.

Rent-seeking contests between groups in communities and among communities

Conflicts between communities/groups and oil companies as well as Nigerian security forces.

Hostage-taking, rampant vandalization, and sometimes, blow-up of oil installations.

Pipeline breaks due to vandalizaion/sabotage doubled between 1999-2004 from 467 to 895, leading to a loss of \$6,8b (watts, 2007)

Introduction: The Niger Delta Crisis

2004-date: Militarization of the conflict, emergence of rival armed groups linked to local politics and elections and control of oil bunkering (theft) routes. Transformed into almost a full-blown insurgency.

300 foreign and 1,000 Nigerian oil workers kidnapped between December 2005 and March 2007 alone.

Presently, about 25% or more of Nigeria's daily production are shut in, and about 100, 000 bpd are bunkered (stolen).

Conflict is estimated to cost about \$60m per day in damages and lost revenue (watts, 2007)

In the closing months of 2004, the Nigerian government declared it had identified 16 ethnic militias in the Niger Delta with training camps in the creeks. Heightened fear that they could manipulate grievances to recruit an increasing number of youths.

Initial Study (Oyefusi, 2008a)

Oyefusi (2008a) provides an important study on youths willingness to join armed militias using survey data drawn from 18 communities in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers and about 1, 350 male respondents. (Information on research design & survey methodology available at <http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets>)

Gloomy picture from sample:

→ **27.67%** of respondents unemployed and not in school or any training. (This disguised significant underemployment).

→ **69.36%** earn below N7, 000 (about \$51.47) and **90.08%** below N15, 000 (about US \$110) monthly.

→ Only **9.27%** completed tertiary education, **51.49 %** never went beyond primary educational level.

→ About **67%** of houses in surveyed communities depend on neighbours' goodwill, water vendors, rains, streams and rivers for their water needs.


→ About **22%** of communities have no electricity supply, while **39%** depends on oil companies for electricity, which is often rationed.

→ About **72%** of houses surveyed either has no toilet facility or uses pit latrine or bowl buckets.

→ **77.74%** of communities surveyed have experienced at least one violent conflict over the past ten years from the date of survey

→ Over **80 %** of individuals highly aggrieved.

Needs Assessment



Main findings

- At the individual level, **income, education, marriage,** and **asset immobility, reduces** the probability of observing a disposition to rebel participation. The likelihood of observing willingness to participate also increases in **ethnic majority.**
- At the community level, **oil size, distance, increases** the probability of observing a willingness to participate in rebellion while **infrastructure constrains** willingness to participate. While **government presence** has the expected negative sign, it is not found to be statistically significant.

Limitations & Need to expand focus

→ Armed struggle being one of the various manifestations of state failure, is only a polar case of civil unrest. Lower-level violence deserves attention

→ While oil-related civil war remains a possibility in Nigeria, a more probable outcome is prolonged low-intensity violence and criminality involving youths in the Niger Delta region (Ukeje, 2001; Ikelegbe 2005; Oyefusi, 2008b).

'Nigeria, a place the worst is highly unlikely though the best may seem impossible'

→ Justifies need to expand the focus.

I examine willingness of youths to participate in three forms of unrest: armed struggle, peaceful protests, and violent protests and associated (oil-related) criminality, and the roles of education and studentship in constraining participation

Variables

- Dependent variable: ***civil unrest***, a multi-choice variable with four outcomes.
 - (i) ***civil peace***, absence of willingness to participate in any form of oil-related unrest (0).
 - (ii) ***peace protest***, willingness to participate in peaceful protests but not in violent protests and armed struggle (1).
 - (iii) ***Violent protest & Oil-related criminality***, willingness to participate in violent protests and/or associated (oil-related) criminality, but not in and armed struggle (2).
 - (iv) ***Armed struggle***, willingness to participate in armed struggle (3).
- Nine explanatory variables taken directly from Oyefusi (2008a). These are ***Education, Income, Studentship, Oil, Oil squared, Infrastructure, Government, Delta and Rivers***.
- The choice of these variables derives from the predictions of the theoretical model developed in the paper

Methodology


Two ways to view outcomes on the dependent variable

- (i) Independent and unordered outcomes: codes have no cardinal or ordinal meaning → a Multinomial Logit Model (MLM) can be applied

- (ii) Ordered outcomes: rational to assume that violence escalates from low to high levels
implications
 - codes have ordinal meanings ($3 > 2 > 1 > 0$ in an ordinal sense),
 - dependent variable measures *intensity* of unrest.
 - 3 implies 2 & 1, 2 implies 1 but not 3, 1 does not imply 2 or 3
 - Ordinal Regression Model (ORM) can be applied.

Further information provided in the appendix

Fig. 1 Willingness to Participate in each Outcome on Civil Unrest by Proportion of Youths



Determinants of willingness to participate in *civil unrest*

Signifi- cance Level	ORM	MLM		
		Peace Protest	Violent Protest	Armed Struggle
1%	<i>Education(-)</i> <i>Income (-)</i> <i>Oil (+)</i> <i>Oil squared (-)</i> <i>Infrastructure (-)</i>	<i>Income (-)</i> <i>Studentship (-)</i> <i>Delta (+)</i> <i>Rivers (+)</i>	<i>Education (-)</i> <i>Income (-)</i> <i>Studentship (-)</i> <i>Oil (+)</i>	<i>Education (-)</i> <i>Income (-)</i> <i>Oil (+)</i> <i>Oil squared (-)</i> <i>Infrastructure (-)</i>
5%			<i>Infrastructure (-)</i>	<i>Studentship (-)</i>
10%			<i>Oil squared (-)</i>	


Oil-Communities Sample

- No significant differences in results (Table 3) .
- As in the overall sample, higher educational attainment reduces the likelihood of willingness to participate in more intensive forms of unrest among youths in the ORM.
- Studentship and government presence has beneficial effect in these communities, whereas the former was not significant in the overall sample.
- The state-level differences also cease to be significant in influencing disposition to more intensive forms of unrest.
- The effects of the explanatory variables in explaining willingness to participate in each outcome on civil unrest parallel what obtained in the overall sample. Higher educational attainment and studentship individually constrains participation in low-level violence and oil-related criminality, as well as disposition to armed struggle.

Table 4 Education, Studentship and the Odds of Participation in *Civil Unrest*

	Relative Risk Ratios					
	Peaceful Protest		Violent Protest		Armed Struggle	
	<i>Overall Sample</i>	<i>Oil-Communities Sample</i>	<i>Overall Sample</i>	<i>Oil-Communities Sample</i>	<i>Overall Sample</i>	<i>Oil-Communities Sample</i>
<i>Education</i>	1.027	0.878	0.582	0.565	0.559	0.529
<i>Studentship</i>	0.5	0.366	0.352	0.265	0.593	0.334

Fig. 2 Educational Attainment & Predicted Probability of Willingness to Participate in each Outcome on Civil Unrest



Higher educational attainment & Predicted Probability of Participation in Peaceful Protest

- Oyefusi (2008a) finds higher educational attainment to increase grievance level among individuals in the region.
- Other studies argue that higher education increases grievance in the face of unemployment, social and political exclusion

What the Overall Results suggest

Protests by aggrieved individuals with higher education are likely to be non-violent, while participation in violent forms of unrest is likely to be by individuals with little or low formal education and who are also not engaged in any on-going formal or vocational training.

Thanks for your attention